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The present paper revisits a property embedded in most dynamic macroeconomic models: the
stationarity of hours worked. First, I argue that, contrary to what is often believed, there are many
reasons why hours could be nonstationary in those models, while preserving the property of balanced
growth. Second, I show that the postwar evidence for most industrialized economies is clearly at
odds with the assumption of stationary hours per capita. Third, I examine the implications of that
evidence for the role of technology as a source of economic fluctuations in the G7 countries.
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Business cycles have long been associated with highly procyclical ￿ uctuations
in labor input measures. In the mind of the common man, the recurrent ups
and downs in employment (or unemployment) observed in modern economies are
arguably more of a de￿ning feature of the business cycle than the accompanying
￿ uctuations in GDP.1Understanding the factors underlying the joint variation
of output and labor input measures remains a key item in macroeconomists￿
research agenda.
The present paper focuses on a dimension of those joint ￿ uctuations that
is generally ignored by macroeconomists, in theoretical as well as in empirical
analysis: the long run behavior of hours worked. In particular, the paper revisits
a property common to the majority of intertemporal equilibrium models used
in macroeconomic applications, namely, that of stationarity of hours worked
per capita. First, I argue that, contrary to what is often believed, stationarity
of (per capita) hours is not a necessary condition in order for those models to
generate a balanced growth path. Second, and perhaps most importantly, I
show that the evidence for the G7 economies is generally at odds with the key
equilibrium relationship that underlies the stationarity of hours in those models.
In fact, that evidence suggests that both margins of labor utilization (i.e., hours
per worker and the employment rate) display some nonstationarity features in
most G7 countries.
The evidence of nonstationarity in hours per worker points to the impor-
tance of using an hours-based measure of productivity when estimating the ef-
fects of technology shocks under the approach proposed in Gal￿ (1999), in which
technology shocks are identi￿ed as the only source of non-stationarity in labor
1Notice also that employment is one of the four monthly indicators monitored by the NBER
Business Cycle Committee for the dating of recessions.
2productivity. The reason is straightforward: shocks unrelated to technology
that have a permanent e⁄ect on hours per worker (but not on output per hour)
would be a source of nonstationarity in employment-based measures of produc-
tivity, and would thus be mislabeled as technology shocks. Below I revisit the
international evidence on the e⁄ects of technology shocks using an hours-based
measure of productivity, ￿nding little evidence in support of a major role of
technology as a source of business cycles.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship be-
tween the stationarity of hours and the balanced growth hypothesis. Section 3
provides some evidence on the behavior of the two margins of labor utilization
for the G7 countries, and discusses the implications of that evidence. Section
4 presents new estimates of the e⁄ects and role of technology shocks in the G7
countries. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Stationarity of Hours and the Balanced
Growth Hypothesis
Since the seminal work by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Prescott (1986),
most business cycle models have adopted a neoclassical growth framework (aug-
mented with a consumption-leisure choice) as a ￿core structure,￿on which sto-
chastic disturbances and frictions of di⁄erent sorts are added. The choice of
a speci￿cation for preferences and technology in the resulting models has been
generally guided by the requirement that the underlying deterministic model
is consistent with some ￿stylized facts￿of growth. It is generally argued that
imposing such a requirement facilitates calibration of the model on the basis of
information unrelated to the business cycle phenomena that the model seeks to
explain.
Prominent among those stylized facts is the observation that many key
3macroeconomic variables like output, consumption, investment, and the stock
of physical capital display a similar average rate of growth over su¢ ciently long
periods of time. That property is referred to as ￿balanced growth￿ . Another
important observation is that hours worked per capita do not display any ob-
vious trend that one could associate with the secular upward trend shown by
the real wage. Third, and in contrast to the real wage, the return to capital (as
re￿ ected, say, in the real interest rate) does not seem to display any signi￿cant
long run trend.
The analysis of King et al. (1988), among others, pointed out that the pre-
dictions of the neoclassical framework can be reconciled with the previous facts
if (i) technology can be represented by a constant returns production function
with labor-augmenting technical progress, (ii) preferences display a constant
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and (iii) the marginal rate of substi-
tution between consumption and hours (or leisure) is homogeneous of degree
one in consumption. Speci￿cations satisfying those properties are commonly
adopted ￿as a discipline device￿ by business cycle theorists, even when their
subject of inquiry is viewed as being unrelated to the forces underlying long
term growth.
Unfortunately, and as argued below, the widespread adoption of an unnec-
essarily strong version of the balanced growth hypothesis has led to a common
misconception, namely, that stationarity of hours worked is an inherent feature
of models displaying balanced growth.2
2Cooley and Prescott (1995), among others, provide an explicit account of that strategy:
￿...we are going to restrict our attention to arti￿cial economies that display balanced growth.
In balanced growth consumption, investment, and capital all grow at a constant rate, while
hours stay constant."
42.1 A Benchmark Framework with no Frictions
To illustrate the basic point let us ￿rst assume a constant returns Cobb-Douglas
technology, implying the following linear expression for the (log) marginal prod-
uct of labor:3
mpnt = yt ￿ nt
where yt denotes output and nt is hours worked (or hours, for short), both
normalized by the size of the working-age population and expressed in logs.
Second, and in a way consistent with the requirements derived by King et
al. (1988), let us assume that preferences imply the following expression for the
(log) marginal rate of substitution
mrst = ct + ’ nt
where ct denotes the log of per capita consumption, and ’ is the reciprocal of
the Frisch labor supply elasticity.4 Notice that normality of both consumption
and leisure requires that ’ > 0.
In a benchmark RBC model with perfect competition in goods and labor
markets and no other distortions, the e¢ ciency condition mrst = mpnt holds
at all times, implying
nt = ￿(1 + ’)￿1 sc;t (1)
where sc;t ￿ ct￿yt is the log of the share of consumption in output (henceforth,
the ￿consumption share￿ ). The intuition behind the negative relationship is
simple: starting from an e¢ cient allocation, both an increase in consumption
(given output) or a decline in output (given consumption) make an additional
unit of leisure more valuable than the marginal use of time in productive activ-
ities, thus calling for a drop in hours to maintain e¢ ciency.
3Constant terms are ignored throughout the paper.
4The assumption of a constant elasticity of the marginal rate of substitution with respect
to hours can be relaxed, but is adopted here for convenience.
5The ￿strong￿ version of the balanced growth property adopted in most
macroeconomic applications requires that sc;t ￿ uctuates about a constant mean
value sc. As a result, it must also be the case that hours are stationary, and
￿ uctuate around a constant mean n = ￿(1 + ’)￿1 sc. In the standard RBC
model (closed economy, no government) the steady sate consumption share sc
and, hence, steady state hours, are determined exclusively by preference and
technology parameters.
2.2 Hours Worked and the Consumption Share: Evidence
for the United States
Next I turn to the data, in order to provide an assessment of the relationship
between hours and the consumption share displayed in (1), and implied by the
simple framework exposited above.
I start by looking at aggregate quarterly U.S. data.5 I use hours of all per-
sons in the nonfarm business sector (LXNFH), normalized by the size of the
population aged 16 or older, as a benchmark measure of hours. As a benchmark
series for the consumption share I use the ratio of personal consumption expen-
ditures in nondurable goods and services (CN+CS) to gross domestic product
(GDP), both expressed in current prices.6 Figure 1.A displays the empirical
counterparts to nt and sc;t. While some negative short-run comovement be-
tween the two series is easily discernible, it is clear that the overall picture is
dominated by what looks like a common upward trend in the second half of the
sample period.
Figure 1.B displays the business cycle component of the two series, obtained
by applying the band-pass ￿lter developed in Baxter and King (1999), and
5Quarterly U.S. data are drawn from from the USECON data set. The sample period is
1948:1-2003:4. The corresponding mnemonics are shown in brackets.
6In the Appendix I show that this is the right measure if one allows for changes in the
relative price of consumption goods.
6calibrated to remove ￿ uctuations of periodicity outside an interval between 6
and 32 quarters. Once the low frequency trends are dispensed with, a strong
negative comovement between hours and the consumption share emerges clearly.
That relationship is consistent with two stylized fact of business cycles, namely,
the procyclicality of hours worked and the fact that consumption is less volatile
than output at business cycle frequencies (which makes the consumption share
countercyclical).
The previous visual assessment is con￿rmed by a straighforward statistical
analysis. Thus, a simple OLS regression of (log) hours on the (log) consump-




sc;t R2 = 0:03
with the simple correlation between the two variables being 0:19. Notice that
the ￿t of the estimated regression equation, as measured by the R2, is extremely
low for a relationship that is supposed to hold exactly. To make things worse,
the sign of the estimated coe¢ cient is inconsistent with the theory￿ s prediction.
By way of contrast, an OLS regression using the business cycle component
of both series yields the estimated equation
nt = ￿1:26
(0:06)
sc;t R2 = 0:61
with the corresponding correlation being ￿0:78. Thus, and while far from dis-
playing the exact relationship implied by the benchmark model, the business
cycle component of hours and the consumption share shows a very strong neg-
ative comovement. Notice also that, strictly speaking, the estimated coe¢ cient
on the consumption share with an absolute value greater than one is inconsistent
with the theory (since it would imply that leisure is an inferior good). Given the
lack of a structural interpretation of the error term, combined with the likely
7distortions introduced by the detrending ￿lter, I do not want to put too much
emphasis on the point estimate.7 Yet, it is worth noticing that the previous
￿nding seems consistent with the requirement stressed by RBC theorists of a
high intertemporal substitution in labor supply in order to account for the large
￿ uctuations in hours.8
2.2.1 Robustness: Alternative Measures
Similar ￿ndings emerge when I use an alternative, more comprehensive, measure
of aggregate hours constructed by multiplying total civilian employment (LE)
by average weekly hours in manufacturing (LRMANUA). The same is true for
measures of the consumption share constructed using two alternative de￿nitions
of consumption, namely, total private consumption (C)￿ which includes durable
goods expenditures￿ , and total consumption (C+GFNE+GSE), which includes,
in addition, nondefense government consumption.
Table 1 reports the estimates of the coe¢ cient of an OLS regression of (log)
hours on the (log) consumption share, using all possible combinations of mea-
sures of both variables, and with standard errors reported in brackets. The sec-
ond column reports the corresponding correlations. The third and four columns
show analogous statistics using the business cycle component of each series. In-
terestingly, when the (un￿ltered) data are used, the regression coe¢ cient has
the wrong sign for all speci￿cations. When I use data on total hours (see bot-
tom panel) the correlation becomes higher and signi￿cant, but always with the
wrong sign (positive). The latter just captures the fact that both series display
a common upward trend for most of the period.
Again, when we turn to the business cycle component, the results change
dramatically: a very strong negative comovement between hours and the con-
7A similar ￿nding, albeit in the context of extimation of a staggered price setting model,
is found in Sbordone (2000)
8As exempli￿ed by the indivisible model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988).
8sumption share emerges for all the speci￿cations.
2.3 Hours Worked and the Consumption Share: Interna-
tional Evidence
Next I examine the comovements of hours and the consumption share for the
G7 countries, in order to assess the extent to which the evidence in the previous
subsection is speci￿c to the U.S. or carries over to other countries. In doing
so I use the data set on hours worked (normalized by population aged 14-65)
constructed by the OECD and part of their Labor Force Statistics dataset.
The data frequency is annual and the sample period, common across countries,
starts in 1970 and ends in 2002. The graphs on the left hand side of Figure
2 display, for each country, the time series for hours and the share of (total)
consumption in GDP. The graphs on the right hand side show the growth rates
of the same variables.9 That graphical evidence is supplemented with Table 2,
which reports, for each country, the correlation between the (log) consumption
share and (log) hours, in both levels and ￿rst di⁄erences.
While the patterns of both variables seen in the ￿gures display substantial
di⁄erences across countries, two basic common features are apparent. First,
neither the consumption share nor hours per capita display any tendency to
revert to some constant mean, over the thirty year period considered. In other
words, there seems to be prima facie evidence of some sort of nonstationarity
in both series. Second, and as con￿rmed by the correlations in Table 2, there is
no evidence of the tight negative relationship between those variables suggested
by (1). Japan is the only country for which a strong negative correlation can
be found between the (log) levels of the two variables.
As it was the case with quarterly U.S. data, when we turn our attention to
9Ggiven the annual frequency of the data, growth rates provide a better representation of
short term ￿uctuations.
9higher frequency changes (as represented by ￿rst di⁄erences here), the correla-
tions become negative (with the exception of Italy), but they are still rather low
in absolute value, and far from the perfect correlation implied by the benchmark
framework above.
2.4 Interpretation
Notice that even under the baseline neoclassical framework described above,
one can think of plausible reasons that would render the consumption share
nonstationary, and which could thus provide a potential explanation for the
nonstationarity in hours within the paradigm. The presence of permanents shifts
(or an underlying trend) in the share of government purchases in GDP may be
the most obvious one, and one that seems to be relevant in the case of the
postwar U.S. economy (since the early 50s to the late 90s that share declined
by about 5 percentage points). Yet, according to the benchmark neoclassical
framework, the increase in the consumption share should have come hand in
hand with a reduction in hours, not an increase like the one observed in the
U.S. economy￿ a pattern displayed also by Canada and Germany￿ nor with the
largely disconnected long run pattern of hours displayed by other countries (with
the possible exception of Japan).
More generally, modern economies are subject to a variety of frictions and
distortions that can account for permanent shifts￿ and, thus unit-root like behavior￿
in hours. Furthermore, this can occur without violating the central element of
the balanced growth hypothesis, namely, that over the long run the main com-
ponents of aggregate demand are expected to grow at the same rate (or, in other
words, their growth rates have a common unconditional expectation).
To illustrate this point consider the following extension of the framework
above, along the lines of Gal￿, Gertler, and L￿pez-Salido (2003). First, one
10may want to allow for a possible wedge between the marginal product of labor
(which, for simplicity, we keep equating to average labor productivity) and the
real wage paid by the ￿rm per hour of work. Letting ￿
p
t denote that wedge we
thus have (in logs):
wt ￿ pt = mpnt ￿ ￿
p
t
= (yt ￿ nt) ￿ ￿
p
t (2)
Second, a wedge may exist between the wage and the (average) household￿ s
marginal rate of substitution, as a result of labor income taxes, wage setting by
unions, e¢ ciency wages, etc.10 Formally, and letting ￿w
t denote that wedge, we
have
wt ￿ pt = mrst + ￿w
t (3)
Finally, and as emphasized by Hall (1997), the marginal rate of substitution
may experience stochastic shifts￿ some of which might be permanent￿ both as
a result of genuine shifts in invidual tastes or composition e⁄ects derived from
demographic forces. We can represent that feature by appending a preference
shock ￿t to our expression for the (log) marginal rate of substitution:
mrst = ct + ’ nt + ￿t (4)
Combining (2), (3), and (4) we obtain the following expression for hours:




Hence, we see that, any permanent shifts in the labor and product market
wedges or in preferences will result in a permanent shift in hours worked, for any
given consumption share. To the extent that we are willing to allow for changes
10This is the wedge emphasized in Mulligan (2002), who provides an analysis of its long-run
behavior in the U.S.
11in any of those variables, there is no obvious reason (other than modelling con-
venience) why all those changes should be stationary. The presence of price and
wage stickiness, with their consequent temporary deviations in markups from
their desired levels, appears perhaps as the only ￿natural￿source of stationarity
in the ￿ uctuations in hours in this context. Some changes in desired markups,
on the other hand, are likely to be permanent (e.g., those resulting from changes
in the regulatory environment) This is also true of changes in taxes that may
a⁄ect the labor market wedge.11 Needless to say, many shifts in preferences or
in the share of consumption in GDP are likely to be permanent in nature.
Given the above considerations, the apparent nonstationarity in hours and
its decoupling from the consumption share should come as no surprise, despite
its central role in common versions of business cycle models.12
2.5 The Two Margins of Hours Variation: A Look at the
International Evidence
It is not the purpose of the present paper to uncover and even less so to quantify
the relative importance of the di⁄erent likely sources of nostationarity in hours.
Yet, a look at the two margins of variation in hours, namely, hours per worker
and the employment rate, suggest that a simple representative agent model
will ￿nd it hard to account for the labor market dynamics behind the observed
changes in hours. The low frequency changes in both margins are substantial,
and display patterns that vary signi￿cantly across countries. This is illustrated
in Figures 3.A-3.G, which show for each G7 country, the evolution of hours
worked per capita (more precisely, per person aged 16 to 65), average hours
11Thus, Prescott (2004) argues that di⁄erences in labor income taxes can account for the
gap in hours worked between the US and Europe. Mulligan (2002) provides evidence of large
and persistent changes in the labor market wedge.
12See Francis and Ramey (2003) for a similar argument using a fully speci￿ed growth model.
In their model, permanent changes in government purchases, tax rates or a preference para-
meter are shown to have a permanent e⁄ect on steady state hours.
12per worker, and the employment rate (i.e., the ratio of employment to working
age population). The data are drawn from the labour force statistics dataset
compiled by the OECD, with the sample periods di⁄ering somewhat across
countries.
As a cursory look at the ￿gures makes clear, the evidence constitutes an
embarrassment of riches. Thus, for instance, the U.S. and Canada display an
upward trend in hours per capita in the late part of the sample, which is the
result of a continuous increase in the employment rate, combined with a ￿ at
pattern for hours per worker. In the early part of the sample, on the other hand,
the relatively stable path for hours per capita hides very di⁄erent (mutually
o⁄setting) trends in hours per worker (downward), and the employment rate
(upward).
The remaining G7 countries.have experienced instead a secular decline in
hours per capita. But again, the underlying composition di⁄ers across countries.
Thus, in the U.K. and Italy it is largely the result of a decline in hours per worker,
combined with a relatively stable employment rate. In Japan, hours per capita
decline in spite of a persistent upward trend in the employment rate. In France
and Germany, on the other hand, the downward trend in the employment rate
only reinforces that of hours per worker.
2.6 Some Implications
While a number of papers have explored the consequences of introducing both
margins of hours variations into a dynamic business cycle framework, I am
not aware of any attempt to enrich those models with features that could help
explain the low frequency changes in hours per worker and the employment
rate highlighted above.13 To the extent that such low frequency variations are
13A possible exception, albeit in the context of a stylized model of wage-setting by
unions/insiders with no explicit variation at the intensive margin, is found in Blanchard and
13due to factors orthogonal to the business cycle phenomena that those models
seek to explain, abstracting from those features may be the right strategy when
developing business cycle models. In particular, the secular decline in hours
per worker observed in most countries would seem to ￿t that description. The
same may be true for the observed long run trend in the employment rate in the
U.S., Canada and Japan. In contrast, a look at the the low frequency variation
of the latter variable in the continental European countries suggests a stronger
connection to cyclical episodes.
Most importantly, and putting aside the implications for the theoretical
modelling of the business cycle, the existence of such low frequency movements
in hours is likely to impinge on empirical analyses and characterizations of eco-
nomic ￿ uctuations and their sources. The controversy, described below, regard-
ing the appropriate transformation of hours in the recent empirical literature
on the e⁄ects of technology shocks is a case in point. The evidence presented
above, contrasts starkly with the assumption of stationarity in hours found in
many empirical applications, and raises some doubts about any empirical ￿nd-
ings that ignore the existence of those low frequency movements, while hinging
on the assumption of stationary hours. Furthermore, as discussed below, the
existence of a signi￿cant nonstationary component in hours per worker, implies
that employment-based measures of productivity will be ridden with a nonsta-
tionary measurement error, which may question the validity of analyses that
made use of those measures. That was the case, due to lack of data availability,
for the international evidence on the e⁄ects of technology shocks reported in
Gal￿ (1999). In the next section I revisit that evidence using data on hours and
hours-based productivity measures for the G7 countries.
Summers (1986).
143 International Evidence on the E⁄ects of Tech-
nology Shocks
3.1 Background
The dynamic e⁄ects of technology shocks and their role as a source of economic
￿ uctuations have been the focus of growing interest among macroeconomists.14
The bulk of the evidence generated by that literature has pointed to e⁄ects
of technology very much at odds with the predictions of the standard RBC
model. In particular, when technology shocks are identi￿ed in a structural
VAR as the source of permanent shifts in labor productivity, they generate
a negative comovement between hours and output (see, e.g., Gal￿ (1999) and
Francis and Ramey (2003)). Furthermore, and not surprisingly in light of the
previous result, the implied estimated contribution of technology shocks to the
variability of output and hours at business cycle frequencies tends to be very
small, an observation which contrasts with the central role assigned to those
shocks as a source of business cycles in the RBC literature.15
In a recent paper, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2003; CEV, here-
after) have pointed to an apparent lack of robustness of the ￿rst ￿nding (i.e.,
the negative response of hours to a positive technology shock) to the use of a
VAR speci￿cation that includes the level of (log) hours, as opposed to detrended
hours or its ￿rst di⁄erence as a labor input measure. More speci￿cally, when
CEV re-estimate the VAR using the level of (log) hours they ￿nd that a pos-
itive technology shock drives hours up, not down, and generates the positive
comovement of hours and output that is the hallmark of the business cycle.16
14For a recent survey of that literature, see Gal￿ and Rabanal (2004)
15Similar results are obtained in Basu et al. (2004) using a growth accounting approach to
construct a measure of technological change. See also the references in the Gal￿ and Rabanal
(2004) survey.
16Yet, it is important to stress that their estimates of the contribution of technology shocks
to the variance of output and hours is rather small, consistent with the ￿ndings in Gal￿ (1999)
and others.
15A recent paper by Fernald (2004) provides a convincing explanation for the
discrepancy of the estimates of the e⁄ects of technology shocks when hours
are introduced in levels. In particular he shows that the presence of a low
frequency correlation between labor productivity growth and per capita hours,
while unrelated to cyclical phenomena, distorts signi￿cantly the estimates of
the short-run responses. Fernald illustrates that point most forcefully by re-
estimating the structural VAR in its levels speci￿cation (as in CEV), while
allowing for two (statistically signi￿cant) trend breaks in labor productivity
(in the mid-70s and mid-90s, respectively ), and showing that hours decline
in response to a positive technology shock in the resulting estimates, in a way
consistent with the ￿ndings obtained when the di⁄erence speci￿cation is used.
A di⁄erent strategy is pursued by Francis and Ramey (2004b). Those au-
thors construct an alternative time series for hours, with an annual frequency
and spanning the entire 20th century. The Francis-Ramey series nomalizes total
hours worked in the business sector using a population measure that excludes
not only the population aged 16 and less (as in CEV), but also the population
older than 65, as well as that enrolled in school or employed by the govern-
ment. The resulting series for hours per capita is largely devoid of any of the
nonstationary features that were apparent in the original series (as discussed in
section 2). Most interestingly, though, when Francis and Ramey re-estimate the
e⁄ects of technology shocks using the (log) level of the new series, they recover
the ￿ndings associated with the detrended or ￿rst-di⁄erenced speci￿cation, i.e.
a positive technology shock induces a short run decline in hours and a negative
comovement between the latter variable and output.
163.2 New Evidence for the G7 countries
Next I present some further evidence on the e⁄ects of technology shocks using
data for the G7 countries. Motivated by the evidence and discussion in section
2, I treat (log) hours (as well as labor productivity) as a di⁄erence-stationary















￿ C(L) "t (5)
where "z
t and "d
t are serially uncorrelated, mutually orthogonal structural dis-
turbances, whose variance is normalized to unity. The polynomial jC(z)j is as-
sumed to have all its roots outside the unit circle. Estimates of the distributed
lag polynomials Cij(L) are obtained by a suitable transformation of the esti-
mated reduced form VAR for [￿xt;￿nt] after imposing the long run identifying
restriction C12(1) = 0.17 That restriction e⁄ectively de￿nes f"z
tg and f"d
tg as
shocks with and without a permanent e⁄ect on labor productivity, respectively.
On the basis of some of the steady state restrictions shared by a broad range of
macro models I interpret permanent shocks to productivity f"z
tg as technology
shocks. On the other hand, transitory shocks f"d
tg can potentially capture a
variety of driving forces behind output and labor input ￿ uctuations that would
not be expected to have permanent e⁄ects on labor productivity. The reader is
referred to Gal￿ (1999) and Francis and Ramey (2003) for a detailed discussion.
A number of recent papers have provided related evidence using data for
countries other than the U.S., as surveyed in Gal￿ and Rabanal (2004). Here
I revisit some earlier evidence using international data, which the ￿ndings of
section 2 might call into question. Thus, in Gal￿ (1999, 2004) and Francis,
Owyang, and Theodorou (2004) a similar structural VAR-based approach is
applied to G7 countries￿quarterly data. In that exercise Gal￿ (1999) used both
17See Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gal￿ (1999) for details.
17￿rst-di⁄erenced and detrended (log) employment as a measure of labor input,
obtaining a negative response of employment to a positive technology shock in
all countries, with the exception of Japan. Similar qualitative results for the euro
area as a whole are found in Gal￿ (2004), where I used the quarterly data set for
the euro area recently constructed by Fagan et al. (2001), also using employment
as a measure of labor input.18 Francis et al. (2004) used ￿rst-di⁄erenced (log)
employment, together with other macro variables, focusing on the potential role
of monetary policy factors in shaping the response to technology shocks.
In light of the evidence and discussion found in section 2, the use of em-
ployment as a measure of labor input raises a potential problem. First, and to
the extent that hours per worker vary over time, employment-based measures
of labor productivity will be ridden with error. Most importantly, however, the
presence of a possible nonstationary component in hours per worker undermines
the theoretical basis for the identi￿cation strategy used in that work. In par-
ticular, it implies that factors other than technology may generate permanent
shifts in measures of output per worker￿ and hence may be incorrectly labeled as
technology shocks￿ , even if they do not have any long run e⁄ect on ￿true￿labor
productivity (i.e., output per hour). The availability of (relatively long) homo-
geneous time series for hours worked in a number of OECD countries allows one
to overcome the above problem. Next I describe the evidence on the e⁄ects of
technology shocks obtained by applying the structural VAR framework above
to hours-based measures of productivity and labor input for the G7 countries.
The top graph in the top panel of Figures 4.A-4.G display, for each G7
country the growth rates of GDP and hours over the period 1970-2002. As it is
clear to the eye, both series display a strong positive comovement, which can be
18In particular, technology shocks are found to account for only 5 percent and 9 percent of
the variance of the business cycle component of euro area employment and output, respectively,
with the corresponding correlation between their technology-driven components being ￿0:67).
18viewed as one of the de￿ning features of the business cycle. The corresponding
unconditional correlations, reported in the third column of Table 3, range from
0:30 (Italy) to 0:84 (US). The second graph shows the components of GDP and
hours growth associated with technology shocks, while the third graph shows
the component driven by other (non-technology) sources. With the exception
of the UK and Japan, the comovement of hours and GDP growth generated by
technology shocks is much smaller than that observed in the original data. As
shown in Table 3, that conditional correlation is even negative in some cases (US,
Italy, and France), and very small in others (Germany and Canada). The ￿rst
two columns of Table 3, which show the estimated contribution of technology
shocks to the variance of GDP and hours growth, suggest a limited role of
technology shocks as a source of ￿ uctuations in the growth rates of either GDP
or hours. In particular, technology shocks account for more than 50 percent of
the variance of hours growth only in Italy and the U.K., though as discussed
below, this can hardly be attributed to the mechanisms underlying RBC model.
A look at the estimated impulse responses of labor productivity, GDP, and
hours to a positive technology shock (i.e., one that raises productivity) helps
understand the previous patterns. Those impulse responses (together with a ￿2
standard errors con￿dence interval) are displayed in the bottom panel of Figures
4.A through 4.G . The sign of the point estimate for the impact responses of GDP
and hours is also reported in Table 3. For all countries but Japan, a positive
technology shock generates either a negligible response of hours or a short run
decline in that variable, in contrast with the predictions of the standard RBC
model. With the exception of the UK, the corresponding response of output
to the same shock is positive. It is thus not surprising that for the remaining
countries (US, Canada, Germany, Italy, and France) technology shocks do not
make the large contribution to the variance of both GDP and hours growth that
19proponents of the RBC paradigm would have led us to expect. In fact, a look at
Table 3 suggests that the pattern of conditional second moments and impulse
responses that one would associate with an RBC model that were capable of
accounting for the bulk of GDP and hours ￿ uctuations can only be found for
Japan. Why the latter country (as well as the UK) displays a pattern di⁄erent
from the rest is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Summary and Conclusions
The present paper has revisited the empirical and theoretical grounds for a prop-
erty found in most dynamic macroeconomic models, namely, that of stationarity
of hours worked per capita. From a theoretical viewpoint, I have argued that
stationarity of hours per capita is not a necessary condition in order for a macro
model to generate a balanced growth path. One can think of many factors that
could lead to nonstationary hours, including permanent shifts in government
purchases or in labor and product market wedges, as well as permanent pref-
erence shifts. In fact, it is hard to imagine why some of those factors would
remain unchanged or display only transitory ￿ uctuations.
From an empirical perspective, I have shown that the evidence for most in-
dustrialized economies appears to be at odds with the equilibrium relationships
that are at the root of the property of stationarity in hours per capita. In fact,
that evidence suggests that both margins of labor utilization (i.e., hours per
worker and the employment rate) display some nonstationarity features in most
countries.
Finally, I have revisited the international evidence on the e⁄ects of tech-
nology shocks using a measure of output per hour for the G7 countries. That
measure overcomes the potential identi￿cation problems that may have resulted
from using an employment-based measure of productivity, given the evidence of
20signi￿cant nonstationarity in hours per worker. The ￿ndings from that exercise
suggest that, possibly with the exception of Japan, the evidence on the e⁄ects of
technology shocks shows major discrepancies with the predictions of standard
real business cycle models.
21Appendix: Hours Worked and the Consumption Share
in a Two-Sector Model
The ￿rst order condition of the household problem is:
wt ￿ pc
t = ct + ’ nt
where pc
t denotes the price of consumption goods.










A weighted average of the previous conditions imply
wt ￿ pt = yt ￿ nt
which, combined with the expression derived above, yields
(pt + yt) = (pc
t + ct) + (1 + ’) nt
Letting sc;t ￿ (pc
t + ct) ￿ (pt + yt) denote the (log) ratio of nominal con-
sumption to nominal output, and rearranging terms yields equation (1) in the
text.
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Comovement of Hours and the Consumption Share: U.S. Evidence 
 
 
  Log - levels  Business Cycle 
Component 
  c s   ρ  
c s   ρ  
   Nonfarm Business Hours 
       
       
Nondurables and Services, Private 0.16  0.19  -1.26  -0.78 
  (0.05)  (0.06)  
      
Total Private Consumption  0.25  0.25  -1.32  -0.71 
  (0.06)  (0.08)  
      
Total Consumption  0.01  0.04  -1-14  -0.76 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  
      
      
  Total Hours 
        
        
Nondurables and Services, Private 0.84  0.66  -1.28  -0.85 
  (0.06)  (0.05)  
      
Total Private Consumption  1.00  0.68  -1.17  -0.67 
  (0.07)  (0.08)  
      
Total Consumption  0.69  0.71  -1.13  -0.74 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  
        










  Correlation between n and sc
  Levels First  Differences 
    
US 0.80  -0.57 
    
Canada 0.23  -0.53 
    
Japan -0.73  -0.49 
    
UK -0.09  -0.10 
    
France -0.07 -0.47 
    
Germany 0.26  -0.53 
    
Italy -0.41  0.01 
    
Data: OECD Labor Force Statistics Database and Annual National        
Income Accounts 
 
 Table 3 
 
Technology Shocks and Business Cycles: International Evidence 
 
 
  Variance share  Correlation (∆n,∆y) Impact  Response 
  var(∆y) var(∆n) Unconditional Conditional  Hours GDP 
           
US 0.09  0.02  0.84  -0.79  -  + 
           
Canada 0.12  0.24  0.83  0.24 -  + 
           
Japan 0.88  0.40  0.70  0.89  +  + 
            
UK 0.54  0.74  0.76  0.93  -  - 
            
Germany 0.17  0.11  0.73  0.07  - + 
            
Italy 0.13  0.65  0.30  -0.26  -  + 
            
France 0.54  0.07  0.56 -0.32  -  + 
            Figure 1. Hours and the Consumption Share: U.S. Evidence
Nondurables and Services
A. Original Data





















B. Business Cycle component

















Figure 2. Hours and the Consumption Share: International Evidence
Hours (solid), Consumption share (dashed)
United States: Levels




























































































































United States: First Differences





























United Kingdom: First Differences









































Figure 3.A  





































































































































































































































































 Figure 3.B  



























































































































































































































































Figure 3.C  




























































































































































































































Figure 3.D  







































































































































































































































Figure 3.E  



















































































































































































































































































 Figure 3.F 































































































































































































































































 Figure 3.G 



















































































































































































































































































Fluctuations and its Sources : United States
G DP and Hours: Annual G rowth Rates

























































1. 5FIGURE 4.B 
Fluctuations and its Sources : Canada
GDP and Hours: Annual Growth Rates



























































 FIGURE 4.C 
Fluctuations and its Sources : Japan
GDP and Hours: Annual Growth Rates
























































 FIGURE 4.D 
Fluctuations and its Sources : United Kingdom
GDP and Hours: Annual Growth Rates





























































 FIGURE 4.E 
Fluctuations and its Sources : Germany
GDP and Hours: Annual Growth Rates


























































 FIGURE 4.F 
Fluctuations and its Sources : France
GDP and Hours: Annual Growth Rates



































































 FIGURE 4.G 
Fluctuations and its Sources : Italy
GDP and Hours: Annual Growth Rates































The Effects of Technology Shocks : Italy
Productivity
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